File: servmod This paper first documents the comparative productivity performance of the United States and Britain since 1870, focusing on the transition in market services from customised, low-volume, high-margin business organised on a network basis to standardised, high-volume, low-margin business with hierarchical management. A model of the interaction between technology, organisation and economic performance is then provided, focusing on the difficulties of transition from networks to hierarchies. Two general lessons are drawn: (1) developments in services must be analysed if the major changes in comparative productivity performance among nations are to be understood fully (2) technological change can cause difficulties of adjustment in technology-using sectors if it is not suited to the social capabilities of the society.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper uses the experience of Britain and the United States to draw some lessons concerning the role of services in overall productivity performance and the difficulties of raising productivity in technology-using sectors. The United States overtook Britain in comparative productivity levels for the whole economy primarily as a result of trends in services rather than trends in industry. US overtaking of Britain in market services occurred during the transition from customised, low-volume, high-margin business organised on a network basis to standardised, high-volume, low-margin business with hierarchical management from the 1870s. This development was dependent on technologies that improved communications and information processing. The transition occurred at different rates in different sectors, but the overall transformation was dependent on the existence of appropriate social capabilities, including a high level of education and a willingness to accept an intensification of the labour process. The technologies were slower to diffuse in Britain as a result of lower levels of education and stronger labour force resistance to intensification.
After documenting the historical trends in section II, we model the transition from networks to hierarchies in section III. We show that networks are more suitable for customised projects while hierarchies are more suitable for standardised projects, that technological change which increases scale or decreases monitoring costs favours hierarchies over networks, and that such technological change may create difficulties of adjustment for a society with a history of success based upon networks. Section IV concludes with two general lessons from the historical and theoretical analysis: (1) we need to analyse de velopments in services if we are to understand fully the major changes in comparative productivity performance among nations (2) technological change can cause difficulties of adjustment in technology-using sectors if it is not suited to the social capabilities of the society.
II. HISTORICAL TRENDS

Comparative productivity in services and the aggregate economy
We begin by setting out in Table 1 comparative productivity trends in the aggregate economy and assessing the importance of services for these trends. In 1870, aggregate labour productivity in the United States was lower than in Britain, with US overtaking occurring in the 1890s. The US labour productivity lead peaked in the 1950s, after which Britain narrowed the gap slowly. The importance of services to Britain's changing comparative productivity position can be demonstrated with the sectoral breakdown in Table 1 . Note first that the long-run trends in comparative labour productivity levels for the aggregate economy owe rather less to trends in industry than is usually assumed in accounts of comparative productivity performance. Thus, for example, between circa 1890 and 1990, the US labour productivity lead in industry declined slightly while the United States went from a position of lower aggregate labour productivity to a 33 per cent lead. Note, second, that comparative productivity trends in services broadly mirror comparative productivity trends for the economy as a whole. That is not to say that industry and agriculture did not matter, particularly in shorter-run fluctuations of comparative productivity. Indeed, Broadberry (1997a) notes that the US productivity lead in manufacturing increased across World War I and again across World War II, but in both cases the increase was not sustained. Also, Broadberry (1998) notes that the shift out of agriculture, a low value-added activity, occurred later in the United States, contributing to the US catching up. But again, even in shorter-run fluctuations, services dominate; the correlation coefficient R between the comparative productivity in the aggregate economy and in services in Table 1 is 0.98, compared with 0.85 between the aggregate economy and industry and 0.65 between the aggregate economy and agriculture.
Comparative productivity patterns wi thin services
Trends in comparative productivity in services as a whole are driven by trends in comparative productivity in market services, where output can be measured independently of inputs. In Table 2 , we nevertheless see that comparative productivity performance within market services has not been uniform. The United States had already built up a substantial lead in transport and communications before World War I, and this lead remained substantial during the interwar period. Despite a reduction in this lead since World War II, Britain remained a long way behind in transport and communications in 1990. In distribution, although the United States had overtaken Britain by World War I, the lead remained relatively small between the wars. Only since World War II has the US lead in distribution been decisive. In finance, professional and personal services, although the United States pulled ahead across World War I, the British lead was restored during the financial crisis of the 1930s, and the US productivity lead in this sector has remained relatively small since World War II.
There are some more disaggregated estimates of comparative productivity for a number of benchmark years in Table 3 , which add some more detail to the picture. First, the comparative productivity trend in transport and communications is mirrored in the trend on the railways, but with an even more dramatic US lead emerging. A substantial productivity gap had also opened up in communications before World War I and in road transport, shipping and air transport after World War II. In financial services more narrowly defined, the United States had pulled slightly ahead of Britain before World War I and built up a bigger lead during the 1920s. The US banking crisis of the 1930s shows up more clearly in these estimates, and the US lead since World War II is more decisive.
Modern business enterprise in US market services
The emergence of the US productivity lead in services is associated with the appearance of modern business enterprise, characterised by standardised, highvolume, low-margin business and multiple operating units managed by a hierarchy of salaried executives. This hierarchical form of business organisation competed with the previously dominant network form of organisation, based on customised, low-volume, high-margin business. The transformation began in transport and communications, spreading later to distribution and finance. As noted by Chandler (1977: 81-121) , the modern hierarchical corporation began on the US railroads during the late nineteenth century. Unlike turnpikes or canals, railways required centralised operation since steam locomotives moved much faster than horse-drawn carriages or barges and operated on a single track. As the length of the track that a railroad operated extended beyond what could be managed personally by a single superintendent, the railroad was divided into geographic divisions, and each division was further subdivided by function and managerial hierarchies appeared (Chandler, 1980: 16) . By the beginning of the twentieth century, the modern corporate form had spread to other parts of the transport and communications sector, including steamship lines, urban traction systems and the telegraph and telephone systems (Chandler, 1977: 189-203) .
These changes in transport and communications were accompanied by the emergence of modern business enterprise in distribution, although it did not diffuse as widely in distribution as in transport and communications. For one thing, there were limits to the degree of centralisation and standardisation that consumers found acceptable in retailing, particularly given the relatively low levels of population density in the United States (Hall et al., 1961: 131-138; Field, 1996: 27) . And second, as Field (1996: 25-27) notes, there were restraints on competition which acted to support small retail outlets. In particular, resale price maintenance retained an ambiguous legal status until 1975 and limited price competition, making it easier for small independent retailers to survive (McCraw, 1996) . In addition, state legislation aimed at supporting the independent retailers applied escalating tax rates to businesses with two or more retail outlets (Tedlow, 1996: 182-258; Perkins, 1999: 119-120 ).
The modern business enterprise was relatively slow to develop in American finance, partly because of the nature of the business, but also partly because of the regulatory environment. Dealing first with the nature of the business, there are obvious dangers in adopting a high-volume, impersonal, standardised approach to banking and finance, since asymmetric information and trust are very important in this sector. Although simple routines have been developed for assessing risks on relatively small transactions, reputation and personal contact have often remained important on large transactions. Hence we should not be surprised to see that lowvolume, high-margin business has continued to be important in financial services, particularly in international finance, where networks of personal contacts can be more important than modern business enterprise in generating high value added (Jones, 1993) . Nevertheless, it seems clear that the emergence of modern business enterprise in banking and finance in the United States has also been limited by regulation. In particular, regulations prevented the growth of inter-state banking, keeping concentration in US banking relatively low (White, 2000: 749) . Calomiris (1995) also cites the Glass-Steagall Act and Regulation Q as helping to keep American ba nks small by keeping apart commercial and investment banking and by setting a ceiling on interest rates that could be paid on bank deposits.
Modern business enterprise and productivity performance in services
The appearance of modern business enterprise in services is associated with the transformation from the counting house to the modern office (Anderson, 1976: 4; Lockwood, 1958: 23-24) . This transformation was permitted by developments in information and communications technologies, which allowed a high-volume approach to business (Yates, 1989; Campbell-Kelly, 1992) . The key developments included the telegraph and the telephone, which are well known, but also new technologies of written communication, which have received less attention.
The telegraph and telephone opened up new possibilities for rapid exchanges of information across large distances, and hence had their biggest impact on businesses spread over large geographical distances, such as shipping companies, railways, merchant wholesalers and international banks. In terms of office management and the switch to productivity-enhancing high-volume business, however, the impact was rather limited, since the telegraph was most often used for ad hoc communications and the telephone for informal communications (Yates, 1989: 21-22) . The introduction of the typewriter, the duplicating machine and the vertical filing system, radically changed the way that a business could produce, reproduce and store documents, which crucially affected the way that the whole business was organised (Yates, 1989: 21-64 ).
In the counting house, written records were slowly entered into large ledger books using quill pen and ink. Copies had to be hand-written or made at the time of writing using a rudimentary letter press, and storage of records was necessarily chronological. The typewriter speeded up the production of documents, and together with shorthand and dictation, freed up time for managers to concentrate on executive decisions. The development of carbon paper and the duplicating machine made possible multiple copies at the time of writing, while the later introduction of photocopying separated reproduction from the production of written records. The replacement of the ledger book by the vertical filing system meant that records no longer had to be stored chronologically, and allowed incoming correspondence, outgoing correspondence and internal memoranda to be combined in a system indexed in a way that suited the record keeper. The 1880s and 1890s saw a wave of invention of other new office machinery in the United States, including primitive calculating machines, which transformed data processing (Cortada, 1993) .
These technological developments played an important role in the emergence of the modern business enterprise, facilitating the standardisation of tasks within large organisations and permitting easier monitoring of employees. The modern office thus became a more intensive working environment than the counting house, with reduced autonomy for workers. These aspects of the transformation of office work are documented by Lockwood (1958: 41-96) , who notes that: (1) the modern office typically employed more clerks than the counting house (2) there was a much higher degree of specialisation of tasks with reduced autonomy for individual clerks (3) recruitment became more impersonal, less dependent on the personal networks of the counting house era (4) hence there were reduced prospects of promotion to partnership within the firm as a narrower range of tasks was undertaken (5) correspondingly, there was less chance for clerks to accumulate the knowledge needed to set themselves up in business if they failed to progress within the firm (6) the material status advantages that clerks enjoyed over the mass of manual workers were eroded in the modern office, particularly from the 1930s.
It should be noted, however, that the intensification occurred for managers as well as for workers, since the former had to monitor the latter closely. We may therefore expect resistance to the adoption of modern office technology where workers have power in the labour market, particularly where trade union density is high. However, we may also expect managers and workers to perceive a common interest in slowing the adoption of modern office technology where product market power is strong and there are rents to be shared. This bargaining approach has been applied by Broadberry and Crafts (1992) to Anglo-American productivity differences in manufacturing during the interwar period, and it is natural to extend the approach to market services, where regulation meant that restrictions on competition were much more systematic and persistent than in manufacturing.
Consolidation in British market services
One defining feature of the modern business enterprise is large scale. A popular myth for a long time was that British industrial firms were smaller than their US counterparts. In fact, in sectors where mass production became the norm in the United States, British firms also consolidated, but performed relatively badly (Prais, 1981; Kinghorn and Nye, 1996; Broadberry, 1997a) . Similarly, in those market services where high-volume, low-margin business became the norm, British firms consolidated. Hence, the sectoral pattern of the emergence of large-scale business in British services looks very similar to the pattern in the United States. Large firms became important first in transport and communications and spread later to distribution and finance. However, by lagging in the adoption of modern office technology, these large British service sector firms failed to achieve the improved productivity performance of their US counterparts. Table 4 presents data on the growth of large firms in Britain, based on lists of the hundred largest employers provided by Jeremy (1991) with corrections by Wardley (1999; . It is clear from Table 4 that in Britain, large firms accounted for a high share of employment in transport and communications already before World War I, and a much lower share in distribution and finance. Equally, it is clear from Table 4 that the numbers employed in large firms increased over time in all service sectors, although in the case of distribution, this did not lead to an increase in the proportion employed in large firms between 1907 and 1935 because of a larger increase of employment in small firms during the depressed conditions between the wars (Foreman-Peck, 1985) . Only after World War II did the share of large-scale retailers (multiples, department stores and co-operatives) in retail sales rise decisively above one -third (Report of the Census of Distribution and Other Services). Chandler (1977; 1990) has focused on rankings of US firms by market capitalisation, and much less is known about employment (Wardley, 1999: 94) . Jeremy and Farnie (2001: 105) note that this is odd, given the emphasis on managerial hierarchies in the Chandler paradigm. Nevertheless, Wardley's (1999: 107) data on employment in forty large US firms do suggest that Britain's large service sector firms were of a similar size to their US counterparts.
The message of Table 4 is that the transformation from the counting house to the modern office was embarked upon in Britain with much the same sectoral pattern as in the United States, beginning in transport and communications and spreading later to distribution and finance. However, the message of Table 2 is that the productivity outcomes were much less successful in Britain. Clearly, there was more to the modern business enterprise than simply scale. Indeed, large scale may simply confer on firms greater market power, which can be utilised to resist painful reorganisation. This is particularly important in services, which are more sheltered from international competition than industry. In much of the service sector, competition from providers located abroad is impossible, while in other parts, firms typically require licenses to operate and are required to submit to a high degree of regulation.
Office technology
Our next task is to quantify international differences in the adoption of productivityenhancing office technology. Although we do not generally have data on telephone usage by business for the period under consideration, we do have data on the diffusion of the telephone by country. Given the differences in ownership densities in Table 5 , it is obvious that there must have been significant international differences in business usage of the telephone. For one thing, business to consumer linkages can only occur on a large scale with high levels of telephone ownership. The most striking thing about Table 5 is the much higher level of telephone ownership in the United States already by 1913, and continuing into the post-World War II period. The scale of the difference is more than can be explained simply by differences in per capita incomes.
One problem here is that the slow development of telephone usage in Britain may reflect simply the supply policies of the Post Office, which had a monopoly of the telephone service for much of the period under consideration (Foreman-Peck and Millward, 1994: 252) .
However, we can show that Britain was also slow to adopt data processing machinery and other office machinery such as the typewriter. In Table 6 , we present some flow data on sales of office machinery in Britain and the United States from the early 1900s to the late 1960s. The starting date reflects the fact that office machinery was not recorded separately in British trade statistics before 1908, while the end date reflects the growing importance of the electronic computer. Sales have been calculated by subtracting exports from the sum of production and retained imports. In the case of typewriters, the volume of units is available, and this has been used in the comparison of sales between the countries. In the case of cash registers, calculating machines and other office machinery, the lack of adequate volume data means that the value of sales must be used in the comparison between countries. Sales values are converted to a common currency using a unit value price ratio, reflecting deviations from purchasing power parity. Finally, current prices in sterling are converted to constant 1929 prices using the UK deflator for GDP at constant factor cost.
For typewriters, the US/UK comparative sales per 1000 population ratio fluctuates around a level of about 3-to-1, giving the US a considerable lead. For cash registers, calculating machines and other office machinery, the ratio fluctuates rather more, but around a higher level of the order of 5-to-1. The flow data on office machine sales, then, point clearly in the same direction as the stock data on telephone ownership, with a large US advantage.
Although nobody has previously assembled data on the diffusion of modern office equipment, there have been a number of case studies of office mechanisation in Britain, which it is helpful to reconsider in the light of our findings on comparative productivity performance. Campbell-Kelly (1998) demonstrates the existence of conservative attitudes towards new technology in the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) before World War I. Thus the POSB resisted the introduction of the typewriter before 1914 on the grounds that given the scale of operations, pre-printed standard responses were cheaper, with more than 550 standard replies in use by 1885, rising to one thousand by 1914 (Campbell-Kelly, 1998 . Similarly, calculating machines were of little value to the POSB because the bank had developed an accounting system that required balances to be calculated only at the end of the year when interest calculations were made. Furthermore, interest computations could easily be made manually since the interest rate of 2.5 per cent corresponded to an exact halfpenny per pound per month and interest was paid only on whole pounds for whole months. The objection to loose-leaf filing depended on a perceived threat to security, since it was almost impossible to lose an account or to create a phantom account by inserting a fresh page in a bound ledger book. In this latter case, the nature of the business set limits to the diffusion of modern office technology. In all three cases, however, note that conservative attitudes to new technology were consistent with economic efficiency. It is therefore important to note that in financial services, there was no substantial Anglo-American productivity difference before World War I.
In transport and communications, however, and particularly on the railways, a large Anglo-American productivity gap had opened up by the interwar period.
Campbell-Kelly's (1994) study of the Railway Clearing House is thus able to uncover examples of persistent inefficiency that remained sheltered from competitive pressures. Thus, for example, the Office Appliances Committee established by the Railway Clearing House in 1920 recommended mechanising the calculation of local ton-mile statistics by buying six Comptometers at £100 16s 0d each (Campbell-Kelly, 1994: 70) Since this allowed the replacement of 70 male clerks by six female clerks, it yielded an annual saving of over £18,000 for a one -time outlay of a little over £600! Campbell-Kelly notes that there were many similar examples, none of which elicited any critical comment from the Office Compliances Committee. It is important that the Railway Clearing House was effectively a monopoly, free from the competitive pressures that would have forced the adoption of the efficient technology.
Social capabilities and education
Developing a concept first introduced by Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973), Abramovitz (1986) argued that a society's ability to absorb new technology is limited by its social capability. The key quantifiable factor affecting social capability is the level of education, and Table 7 provides data on formal schooling in Britain and the United States. Although there are obvious difficulties in comparing enrolment data across countries, these issues have been worked over by a number of scholars, and it is now possible to draw fairly firm conclusions in several areas (Mitch, 1992; Goldin, 1998; Lindert, 2001) . First, it is clear tha t Britain lagged behind the United States in the provision of mass primary education until about 1900, as has been widely noted in the history of education literature. Second, Britain lagged behind the United States in the development of mass secondary education between the two World Wars. This has been noted by historians of education such as Ringer (1979: 252-253) , and has also been emphasised recently in the work of Goldin (1998) . Third, Britain lagged behind the United States in the provision of mass higher education after World War II. By 1990, tertiary enrolment ratios in Britain were still a long way behind US levels.
Three points should be borne in mind when interpreting these trends. First, the transfer from primary to secondary education has generally occurred at a later age in the United States than in Britain, affecting the breakdown between primary and secondary education. Second, however, it is not possible to give enrolment ratios for narrower age bands, as the difference between primary and secondary education was a matter of class as well as age before World War II. Third, some of the educational deficiency in Britain may have been made up by part-time commercial education, particularly with the growth of shorthand courses at the end of the nineteenth century (Anderson, 1976: 101-104; Guerriero Wilson, 1998: 60-62) . However, the limited evidence of enrolments on such courses in Glasgow and Lancashire and Cheshire suggests that this could not have overturned the substantial US educational advantage (Guerriero Wilson, 1998: 134; Anderson, 1976: 92, 97) . The higher enrolment rates in the United States clearly reflect a greater investment in human capital per person than in Britain.
Previous researchers have tended to play down the role of educ ation in differential productivity performance between Britain and the United States. This is partly as a result of the focus on industry, where the link between formal schooling and the tasks performed by most workers is rather tenuous. In services, by contrast, the link between the tasks performed by most office workers and education (particularly the three R's and languages) is rather closer. Note also that the role of education emphasises the importance of non-market services for the productivity perfor mance of market services, since education has been one of the key outputs of the non-market service sector.
Intensification, monitoring and labour resistance
The intensification of work and the intrusiveness of monitoring in the modern office are well illustrated by the data on clerical standards recommended by the Systems and Procedures Association of America in 1960, reproduced here in Table 8 . In addition to these extraordinarily precise allowances for "open and close" and "chair activity", there are detailed timings for many other activities, including "cut with scissors", which gives different timings for the first snip and for each additional snip (Braverman, 1974: 322) . The example is extreme, but there can be no doubt about the loss of autonomy with the general trend towards intensification and monitoring in the modern office.
These developments were clearly unwelcome to established office workers, and led to a dramatic change in the composition of the British clerical labour force during the first half of the twentieth century. Routh's (1965: 4-5) Rotella (1981: 168-169 ) as a response to the standardisation of office work, which removed many of the firmspecific skills of the counting house. These firm-specific skills had acted as a barrier to the employment of women, who were perceived as having shorter attachments to the labour force.
We would argue that it is useful to see these developments as parallel to the adoption of mass production technology in manufacturing. It is well established in the literature that mass production technology did not fit well with British social capabilities, and there are signs of similar difficulties with modern office technology in the British service sector. In manufacturing, craft workers opposed the introduction of mass production technology that was seen as threatening workers' control over the production process (Lewchuk, 1987; Zeitlin, 1997) . Industrial relations were at their worst in large plants, where mass production methods were most likely to be introduced (Prais, 1981; Broadberry, 1997a) .
As with mass production technology in manufacturing, modern office technology in services reduced the autonomy of workers, creating an army of workers performing standardised tasks and subject to close monitoring. It is worth noting that, as in manufacturing, the pattern of British trade union densities in Table 9 tended to follow the pattern of big business growth in Table 4 , with high union densities in the large-scale hierarchically organised transport and communications sector, and lower union densities in the distribution and financial services sectors. It seems likely that the degree of employment concentration acts as a proxy for the amount of autonomy experienced by individual workers, with the working conditions of workers becoming increasingly standardised in larger organisations (Lockwood, 1958: 141; Anderson, 1976: 110) . Also, it should be noted that transport and communications has been a particularly strike -prone sector during much of the twentieth century, in some years even accounting for more than half of all working days lost through strikes (Mitchell, 1988: 144-146 ).
In fact, however, as in manufacturing, there is evidence that managers disliked the intensive monitoring as much as the workers who were being monitored. Thus, Campbell-Kelly (1998: 24) finds managers in the Post Office Savings Bank as strongly opposed as the workers to the introduction of modern office technology. The decision to retain bound ledgers, for example, was supported by management with the argument that a card-based system would be "most troublesome and distasteful to the clerks" and would "render their daily duties more irksome and difficult". As Campbell-Kelly (1998: 24) notes, the concern of the managers with the welfare of the workers rings rather hollow given their previous record, but there can be no doubt about their distaste for modern office technology. It is not simply that unionised workers resisted the attempts of managers to introduce new technology. Rather, workers and managers shared rents arising from a sheltered competitive environment.
This reluctance of British managers to adopt a system of tight monitoring is reflected in the emphasis on the decentralised network form of organisation in large British service sector firms, which is usually contrasted with the more hierarchical forms of organisation in US business during the twentieth century (Jones, 1993; Boyce, 1995; Broadberry and Ghosal, 2001 ).
III. A MODEL OF TECHNOLOGY, ORGANISATION AND PRODUCTIVITY
PERFORMANCE
The model
We now draw out the general lessons from the particular historical episode, using an economic model of technology, organisation and economic performance. The model also provides a check on the internal consistency of the historical argument. A more formal model is presented in Broadberry and Ghosal (2001b) , but here we rely on a diagrammatic exposition. Each individual agent i has a discount factor δ , where 1 0 < < δ . We use this discount factor to aggregate the utility an agent receives within each period to obtain a lifetime utility for the agent. The discount factor can be thought of as reflecting the impatience of an individual agent. When δ is low, an individual is impatient and puts a higher utility weight on current consumption relative to future consumption. When δ is close to one, an individual is patient and discounts future consumption less.
There is an entrepreneur, agent 0, who is endowed with information about a project. The project technology can be either customised or standardised. In the customised project, individual agents must make decisions in the light of individual information. There is a minimum project size K+1 , with agent 0 and K other agents.
All agents, including agent 0, must invest their good and choose actions a to match participant -specific shocks ?. There is a highest level of project output In a hierarchy, agent 0 invests in the monitoring technology, and specifies the actions of project members and their payments, subject to feasibility and participation constraints.
At each period t, a project has a history, which can be described in terms of past membership and past project output. At each t, a strategy for an individual project member specifies all current choices as a function of history and currently available information. We study dynamic equilibria in strategies, with the requirement that all members of a project behave and are treated in the same way, both within and across periods.
Results
In this section, we state some results which characterise the dynamic equilibria, using a simple diagrammatic exposition.
RESULT 1: A network may operate a customised project efficiently through a group reputation mechanism, while a hierarchy may not.
With a customised project, there are individual shocks, which cannot be observed by the entrepreneur. In a network , the share of output for each agent is fixed in proportion to his initial investment. However, each agent participating in today's project gets a future reward from continuing to be selected for membership of the network in the future (this future reward is discounted by δ ). In a network, individuals are induced to match actions to shocks through a group reputation mechanism, together with the associated persistence of membership, since although individual effort cannot be monitored, group output can. An individual who is tempted to behave opportunistically must weigh up the short run gains against the loss of future utility from network participation when his membership is terminated.
The essence of the result can be shown diagrammatically in Figure 1 , where we study the trade-off faced by a single current project member, given that all other current and future project members choose appropriate actions. The benefit of deviating from the appropriate action N c B is a one-shot gain, and hence does not vary with the discount rate δ . On the other hand, if the current project member deviates, project output is reduced. Therefore, agent 0 will detect that some current member has chosen an inappropriate action. This allows agent 0 to condition future membership in the project as a function of other agents' actions. Therefore, the cost of deviating from the appropriate action δ , however, it is possible for networks to run the customised project efficiently.
In a hierarchy, it is not possible to sustain the efficient outcome with high output in a customised project, because the shocks are privately observed and agent 0 does not have sufficient information to specify from the centre the correct actions to be taken by individual project members.
RESULT 2: A hierarchy may operate a large-scale standardised project efficiently, but a small-scale standardised project may be operated efficiently only by a network.
Under the standardised technology, investment in the monitoring technology allows agent 0 to verify whether the action chosen by an individual project member matches the common shock and to operate the project as a hierarchy. The problem for agent 0 is thus to condition payments to individuals on actions so that all agents choose the appropriate action. Figure 2 illustrates this problem for an individual project member.
Agent 0 pays each current project member a wage (w) to compensate the utility cost of choosing the appropriate action, so that the project member is indifferent between participating and not participating in the project. In Figure 2 , agent 0 picks the wage w* that equate the utility from the outside option (UR) to the net utility cost of choosing the appropriate action NU(w), which depends on the wage. If the per capita project output net of monitoring costs
is lower than w*, the hierarchy is not feasible. On the other hand, when the per capita project output net of monitoring
for a larger project of size K', is higher than w*, then the hierarchy is feasible. Hence a large enough standardised project can be run efficiently by a hierarchy.
For a smaller standardised project, a network can use a reputation mechanism to run the project efficiently without investing in the monitoring technology. The group reputation mechanism is used as in Figure 1 .
Results 1 and 2 characterise how customised and standardised projects may be operated efficiently by networks and hierarchies. These results suggest that in general, we would expect to see customised projects run by networks and standardised projects run by hierarchies. Next, we take changes in project technology as exogenously determined and examine the organisational response. We show that technological change that favours large -scale standardised projects may create some difficulties of adjustment for an economy with a history of networks operating small-scale customised projects.
RESULT 3: As project scale increases, a hierarchy is more likely to operate a standardised project efficiently, while a network is less likely to operate a customised (or standardised) project efficiently.
A hierarchy is more likely to be feasible when the scale of the project is large. This is illustrated in Figure 3(a) , where a point represents a particular combination of monitoring cost and scale, so that each project technology corresponds to a point. For a hierarchy to be feasible, the project technology mist lie to the south east of the feasibility constraint, which is upward sloping since higher fixed costs of monitoring must be spread over a larger scale of project output. At the project technology given by point A, the entrepreneur will use the network form of organisation. A change in project technology with larger scale, such as point B, makes it feasible for the entrepreneur to use the hierarchical form of organisation to run the project. A fall in monitoring costs holding scale constant will also make a hierarchy more feasible.
We can illustrate the difficulties faced by a network operating a customised technology as scale increases using Figure 3 Second, however, and offsetting this, the costs of deviating are also higher in the large scale case because the future payoff from continued membership is higher with the higher productivity associated with the increase in scale. Hence δ . This is a reasonable assumption to make when considering a moderate relative productivity decline such as Britain compared with the United States.
Result 3 suggests that networks may have to transform themselves into hierarchies to operate the standardised technology efficiently. So far, we have assumed that the utility cost of matching an action to a shock in a hierarchy is the same as in a network. However, there are at least two reasons for thinking that this will not be the case. First, there is a loss of autonomy as after the transition to a hierarchy, network members submit thems elves to centralised decision making. We assume that this loss of autonomy is reflected in an additional utility cost G of matching an action to a shock. The second reason for higher utility costs in the standardised project would be if some additional education or training is required.
Similarly for the entrepreneur, G can be thought of as measuring the utility cost of the extra burden of responsibility in the transition to a hierarchy from a network. . Therefore, the post-transition hierarchy is no longer feasible. Hence existing network members will face an incentive to resist transition if they care sufficiently about the loss of autonomy associated with the adoption of a hierarchical form of organisation or if they face sufficiently large education or training costs. A society with a low level of general education may therefore be expected to face a higher adjustment cost G. Note also that a low level of education may lead to a low reservation level of utility (UR), making it easier to sustain a network, which requires the payment received by project members to be above UR.
IV. CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM HISTORY
We began by considering a specific historical episode, the changing comparative productivity performance of Britain and the United States since 1870. We noted that (1) the United States overtook Britain in comparative productivity levels for the whole economy primarily as a result of trends in services rather than trends in industry (2) US overtaking of Britain in market services occurred during the transition to standardised, high-volume, low-margin business with hierarchical ma nagement from the 1870s (3) this development was dependent on technologies that improved communications and information processing (4) the transition occurred at different rates in different sectors, but the overall transformation was dependent upon the existence of appropriate social capabilities, including a high level of education and a willingness to accept an intensification of the labour process (5) the technologies were slower to diffuse in Britain as a result of lower levels of education and stronge r labour force resistance to intensification.
We then presented a model of technology, organisation and economic performance, which both draws out the general lessons from the particular historical episode and provides a check on the internal consistency of the argument. We showed that: (1) a network with decentralised decision-making is a more suitable organisational form than a hierarchy with centralised decision making and monitoring for carrying out customised projects where project members must make decisions in the light of individual information (2) a hierarchy is a more suitable organisational form than a network for carrying out standardised projects where the decisions of project members depend on common project-wide information rather than individual information (3) a rise in project scale or decrease in monitoring cost increases the feasibility of hierarchies and decreases the feasibility of networks (4) technological change that favours large scale standardised projects may create difficulties of adjustment for a society with a history of success based upon (and hence social capabilities suited to) networks.
Finally, we would emphasise two general lessons that follow from this historical and theoretical analysis. First, an understanding of the major changes in comparative productivity performance among modern economies requires an understanding of developments in services. The study of economic growth has been focused for too long on industry. This point has been made recently by Bernard and Jones (1996) for the period since 1970, but it applies equally to the previous century.
Second, technological change can cause difficulties of adjustment in technology-using sectors if it is not suited to the social capabilities of that society. The focus of much of the growth literature on technology-producing sectors has again been unhelpful. Wardley (1999; . Sectoral employment data from Feinstein (1972) . Source: Bain and Price (1981) . 
